(By Felicito C. Payumo, former Representative, 1st District of Bataan, Former Chairman/Administrator, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority)
The Supreme Court has been known to be very strict in the observance of the substantive and procedural requirements of due process. It was unbending on this rule in Garcia vs. COMELEC, the case involving the first exercise in recalling an elective official.

On the eve of July 1, 1993, the majority of the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly of Bataan constituted themselves for the purpose of the recall of the incumbent Provincial Governor, Enrique T. Garcia. The PRAC of Bataan, composed of all the mayors, vice mayors and councilors of the 12 municipalities of Bataan, had a membership of 144, and its majority was 73. While 74 signatures were found genuine in their Resolution—barely but still satisfying the 5% plus 1 requirement, the Supreme Court nullified the resolution. What was the reason? For failing to give notice to all members of the assembly, especially the political allies of Governor Garcia. Never mind if the Local Government Code provided that 5% plus 1 was sufficient to initiate the recall, and that it did not specifically require sending of notice to all members. The majority members argued that they had the number, so why bother with the rest? But the Supreme Court was not impressed. It ruled that “the due process clause of the constitution requiring notice as an element of fairness is inviolable and should always be considered as part and parcel of every law in case of its silence. To the extent that the other members were not notified of the meeting of the assembly, to that extent is the sovereign voice of the people they represent nullified.”
The convenors had to comply and sent notices to all members of the PRAC (via registered mail, telegrams, and other means showing proof of delivery) to one again “convene in session on September 26, 1993 at the town plaza of Balanga, Bataan at 8:30 o”clock in the morning.” The PRAC convened and 87 of its members once more passed a resolutions calling for the recall of Governor Garcia. Thirteen (13) more signatures were added to the original 74! But that’s another story.
Governor Garcia, then filed a Supplemental Petition and Reiteration of Extremely Urgent Motion pressing for their contention that the PRA mode of recall provided in section 70 of RA 7160 was unconstitutional. It was here that the Supreme Court reiterated that “every law enjoys the presumption of validity… To strike down a law as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the statute permits.” A recall election was set in which the official being recalled was, automatically, a candidate.
The rest was history. Governor Garcia lost to Governor Ding Roman in the recall election. But Garcia had since won in subsequent Gubernatorial election, after Roman has completed his 3 terms.

My purpose in bringing up this case is not to reopen old political wounds but to draw lessons from the experience. Looking back, I now see the merit for the Supreme Court’s assiduous insistence in the observance of due process. Governor Garcia was going to be subjected to a recall election. At the very minimum, he had that right to due process which the pro-recall group, to which I then belonged, ignored.

Fatal Flaw
Given this strict ruling of the Supreme Court, we see a fatal flaw in the process done by the Sigaw ng Bayan petitioners in securing the elleged 6.3 million signatures. The petition was peddled around for signatures in the barangays., not in signing booths or stations where an election registrar or his representative could be present to witness the signing. How, then, can the more than 1 500 Municipal Elections Registrars verify those signatures? By comparing them to the voters’ specimen signatures in the Registry of Voters, I suppose. But are they all handwriting experts? Had there been signing stations or booths, (as in election booths) where teachers could check the voters’ ID with their names in the register, perhaps one can argue for presumption of validity of the process. We do not even have to go into the question of whether the people were coerced or duped. That question is: are the 6.3 million signatures genuine and verifiable? That is what then Justice Artemio Panganiban asked, even as he dissented in the Santiago vs COMELEC case.
Now, what is the significance of the Garcia Case to Sigaw’s Pirma petition? The Supreme Court protected the right of Garcia. He was one individual, and a local executive. In contrast, Sigaw’s Pirma seeks the wholesale abolition of the Senate, an institution composed of twenty four (24) individuals who are national officials. Are they not deserving of the same protection? Can the Supreme Court be so cavalier in its treatment of the right of 24 Senators? What is the due process that the Senators are entitled to? Section 13 (f) of RA 6735, An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum requires that “the petition shall be signed before the Election Registrar, or his designated representative, in the presence of the representative of the proponent… Signature stations may be established in as many places as may be warranted.” While this section refers to initiative on national laws and local legislation and petitions, then all the more should it apply to petitions of national import. Was this procedure punctiliously, meticulously and strictly followed? Aside from the right of the Senators, the exercise of People’s Initiative is laden with greater and far significant implications. It involves not just the removal of an elected official or officials, but the overhaul of our Constitution.
Should this exercise not be subjected to an even higher bar of observance of the substantive and procedural requirements of due process? To my mind, this is what the anti-Pirma group should attack. Not the difference between revision and mere amendment where lawyers have ample room to argue. Not the inadequacy of the enabling law which the Supreme Court can reconsider. After all, it has many times decided that “every law enjoys the presumption of validity,…and the presumption rests on the respect due to the wisdom, integrity, and the patriotism of the Legislative, by which the law is passed, and by the Chief Executive by whom that law is approved.” (Alba vs. Evangelista, 100 Phil. 683 (1957)
But this lack of observance of the substantive and procedural requisites is what perhaps, as Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J pointed out in his column, Chief Justice Panganiban meant when he stated, “This to my mind is the crucible, the litmus test of a people’s initiative…if as claimed by many, these 6 million signatures are fraudulent, then let them be exposed and damned for all history in a signature verification process under our open system of legal advocacy.”